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MASSACHUSETTS COMMISSION AGAINST DISCRIMINA-
TION v. FRANZAROLI: A PROBLEM IN ADMINISTRATIVE
ENFORCEMENT OF FAIR HOUSING LAWS
I. INTRODUCTION
In Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination v. Fran-
zaroli,' the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ruled that the
state's antidiscrimination agency could award damages for mental suf-
fering to a victim of housing discrimination. Many state and local
governments have established antidiscrimination commissions under
statutes and ordinances similar to the Massachusetts statute,2 and
although a similar award was successfully enforced in a lower New
York court,' Franzaroli is the first case in which the highest court of
a state has upheld a commission award comprised in part of compen-
sation for mental suffering 4 The Massachusetts decision is also un-
usual because the mental suffering award was founded upon a bare
finding of discrimination with little if any consideration of its effects
on the victim.'
However laudatory the motives of the agencies or the courts
sustaining their awards, compensation for mental suffering absent proof
of the effect of discrimination upon the victim cannot be supported
by these antidiscrimination statutes. This Comment suggests that
underlying such awards is a tension between state and federal fair
housing enforcement threatening to disrupt the operation of state
agencies and to preempt their function in this area unless they are
given expanded authority to award damages capable of deterring dis-
crimination and recompensing victims as adequately as federal remedies.
II. MCAD v. Franzaroli
On November 6, 1967, Mandred Henry, a Negro resident of
Worcester, Massachusetts, answered a newspaper advertisement for an
apartment. A woman identifying herself as the owner politely agreed
1.. Mass. -, 256 N.E2d 311 (1970).
2 By 1961, twenty states had such commissions charged with enforcing antidis-
crimination legislation, many of which-including Massachusetts'-were patterned after
the New York State Commission. Note, The Right to Equal Treatment: Adminis-
trative Enforcement of Antidiscrimination Legislation, 74 HAgv. L. REV. 526, 527 n.7
(1961) ; see N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 1969, at 82, col. 2.
3 Commission on Human Rights v. Knox Realty Corp., 56 Misc. 2d 806, 290
N.Y.S.2d 633 (Queens County 1968). Contra, Commission on Human Rights v.
Hardenbrook Realty Corp., 57 Misc. 2d 430, 292 N.Y.S.2d 775 (Queens County 1968) ;
Weynberg v. Commission on Human Rights, 56 Misc. 2d 1, 287 N.Y.S.2d 1002 (Kings
County 1968).
4 Such awards have received favorable publicity. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Mar. 4,
1970, at 95, col. 3; id., May 17, 1970, at 50, col. 3; id., Sept. 24, 1969, at 1, col. 5.
6 See note 19 infra.
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to show the apartment the next morning.8 When no one appeared
for the appointment, Mr. Henry approached a tenant in the building
who professed to know nothing of the vacant apartment. Several
minutes later the tenant and another woman appeared on the porch,
then turned and reentered the building without speaking to Mr. Henry.
Shortly thereafter a third woman came to the door and explained that
the owner had just called saying that the apartment had been rented
earlier that day to a school teacher.'
Mr. Henry contacted Fair Housing, Inc., a private, nonprofit
organization which investigates charges of unlawful discrimination.8
A Fair Housing representative then visited the apartment and obtained
from the owner's agent the name and address of the person who had
allegedly rented the still vacant apartment. The representative then
contacted the new "tenant" and learned that the agent, a Mrs. Locke,
had rented the apartment to her on November 12, and had stated that
she had previously received a call from the second-floor tenant concern-
ing Mr. Henry, that she did not want to rent to a Negro, that she would
predate the deposit receipt to establish that the apartment had been
rented before Mr. Henry applied, and that if anyone inquired, the
new tenant should say that the apartment was rented on November 6.
On November 8, Mr. Henry filed a complaint with the Massa-
chusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD) charging
George and Mary Franzaroli, the owners, with unlawful discrimination
in the rental of housing accommodations.' Following its statutory
procedure, the MCAD investigated and found probable cause to believe
Mr. Henry's allegations." A conciliation agreement was entered on
April 2; the Franzarolis agreed to refrain from further unlawful
discrimination, to rent the apartment (which the intervening tenant
had eventually refused) to Mr. Henry, and to pay him $475 in com-
pensation.' But the Franzarolis defaulted on the agreement after
paying $175. Pursuant to the Commission's statutory authorization,. 3
a public hearing was held on December 5. On January 16, 1969, the
6Hearing Transcript at 19, Henry v. Franzaroli, No. PrH IX-82-C (Mass.
Comm'n Against Discrimination, Dec. 5, 1968) [hereinafter cited as Hearing Tran-
script].
7 Id. 20-21.
8For an anecdotal account of the operations of one such organization, see
Ickeringill, Was It Really Rentedf When. A Black Wonders, The White Volunteer
Finds Out, N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 1970, at 44, col. 1.
9 Hearing Transcript 50-52.
10.- Mass. at -, 256 N.E.2d at 312.
11 MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 151B, § 5 (Supp. 1969). This section empowers the
Commission to combat violations of statutes prohibiting discrimination in areas of
employment, labor organizations, employment agencies, insurance and bonding, mort-
gages, housing, and real estate, id. § 4 (Supp. 1969), municipal housing projects, id.
ch. 121B, § 32(e) (Supp. 1969), and public accommodations, id. ch. 272, §§ 92A, 98
(1968).
12 Brief for Petitioner at 2, Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination v.
Franzaroli, - Mass. -, 256 N.E.2d 311 (1970).
13 MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 151B, § 3 (1965), as amended, (Supp. 1969).
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MCAD found that the respondents had engaged in unlawful discrimi-
nation and awarded Mr. Henry $844.50 damages including $250
compensation for mental suffering.'4 The respondents failed to comply
with the Commission's order and enforcement was sought in the
superior court. The court entered a decree without opinion enforcing
the cease and desist provisions of the order but not the award of
damages. 5 The Commission appealed to the supreme judicial court.
Reversing the superior court's denial of damages, the supreme
judicial court looked first to the statute empowering the Commission
to compel certain affirmative actions by those practicing unlawful dis-
crimination.' In addition to requiring the respondent to cease and
desist from the unlawful practice, the Commission's order can require
affirmative action including, but not limited to, hiring, reinstating, or
upgrading employees, with or without back pay, or reinstating the
victim in any labor organization. 17 If the violation relates to housing,
real estate, or municipal housing programs, the Commission may addi-
tionally award the complainant
damages not to exceed one thousand dollars, which damages
shall include, but shall not be limited to, the expense incurred
by the petitioner for obtaining alternative housing or space,
for storage of goods and effects, for moving and for other
costs actually incurred by him as a result of such unlawful
practice or violation; provided, however, that such damages
shall not include attorneys' fees.' 8
The court seized upon the phrase "but shall not be limited to" as
statutory authorization for the Commission's award. Without offering
a rationale for this conclusion, the court simply concluded that the
award was supported by substantial evidence and untainted by error
of law. As for the mental suffering portion of the award, the court
said:
In view of the statutory power of the commission, and the
recognition in our cases that damages for mental suffering
may be recovered in appropriate cases, Meagher v. Driscoll,
99 Mass. 281 (wrongful removal of a child's body from its
grave), Fillebrown v. Hoar, 124 Mass. 580 (wrongful evic-
tion), Lombard v. Lennox, 155 Mass. 70, 71, 28 N.E. 1125
14Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Orders at 5, Henry v. Franzaroli,
No. PrH IX-82-C (Mass. Comm'n Against Discrimination, Jan. 16, 1969). The
other elements of damage were $94.50 actual damages for gasoline, tolls, use of a
company car and a flat mileage allowance, and $500.00 for loss of time. The total
award of $844.50 was reduced to $669.50 by allowing as an offset the $175 previously
paid by the Franzarolis. Hearing Transcript 45, 56-58.
15 Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination v. Franzaroli, Equity No. 89927
(Suffolk Super. Ct., June 4, 1969).
'6 MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 151B, § 5 (Supp. 1969).
17 Id.
18 Id. (emphasis added).
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(discharge from employment), an award by the commission
of $250 for mental suffering was not improper.19
This reasoning suggests that rather than testing the legitimacy of each
item of damages against the statute itself, the court initially found a
general power to award damages and then contented itself with testing
19-. Mass. at -, 256 N.E.2d at 313. Because, as this citation indicates, Massa-
chusetts cases ruling on awards of damages for mental suffering are scarce, the court
was left a great deal of latitude in its review of the MCAD. Lombard v. Lennox,
155 Mass. 70, 28 N.E. 1125 (1891), was an appeal from an action based on the
procurement of a wrongful discharge from employment. The court found the case
analogous to one of slander (under which penal damages cannot be recovered in
Massachusetts, in the absence of statutory authorization, see sources cited note 44
infra) and, apparently with only the pleadings before it, ruled that "the facts alleged
are such as would naturally cause the plaintiff mental suffering." Id. at 72, 28 N.E.
at 1126. Specifically not ruling on "the question whether these facts conclusively
establish the existence of such an injury," the court held that the question of damages
for mental suffering should have been considered. Id. at 71, 28 N.E. at 1125. In
Fillebrown v. Hoar, 124 Mass. 580 (1878), an action of illegal eviction, the plaintiff's
family had been turned out in his absence and during inclement weather. The court
held that the jury should have been charged that the plaintiff was not entitled to
recover for his grief at his family's illness, among other things, but that his recovery
"must be limited to the injury to his feelings by reason of the indignity and insult of
being unlawfully turned out of his home with his family." Id at 585. Meagher v.
Driscoll, 99 Mass. 281, 285 (1868) held that in an action for trespass quare clausem
fregit for the removal of a body from a grave, the father might recover for mental
suffering.
[T]he circumstances which accompany and give character to a trespass
may always be shown either in aggravation or mitigation. . . . Under such
circumstances, the natural injury to the feelings of the plaintiff may be taken
into consideration in trespasses to real estate as well as in other actions of tort.
Each of these cases held that damages for mental suffering should be considered
as a part of the ordinary and natural consequences of the tort, but none of them offer
guidance or standards to establish what must be shown to establish those damages.
Assuming the court in Fransaroli was holding that such damages could be considered
by the MCAD under the same theory, there remains some question whether this award
is supportable under generally accepted requirements of proof of damages in such
cases. For example, RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 905, comment b(i)
at 547-48 (1939) states:
The length of time during which pain or other harm to the feelings has been
or probably will be experienced and the intensity of the distress are the two
factors to be considered in assessing the amount of damages. In determining
this, all relevant circumstances are considered, including sex, age, condition in
life and any other fact indicating the susceptibility of the injured person to
this type of harm.
The actual testimony presented at the hearing in support of the award was as
follows:
Q. Now, to go on to a different subject, did you believe, on November
6th, that you were being discriminated against?
A. I certainly do.
Q. Did you believe it then?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Please tell the Commission your emotional reaction to these events?
A. I don't know if you can describe them, other than frustration, to be
honest, and complete anger and like a slap in your face. You know, you
expect a slap in your face, but when somebody really slaps you, then it starts
hurting. That's the only thing I can say.
Q. Had you suffered prior instances of discrimination?
A. No, not that I can recall.
Q. Were you upset by this?
A. Very much so, upset.
[Counsel] : That's all I have of this witness.
Hearing Transcript 37. This evidence only questionably supports the "substantial
evidence" test applicable here, MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 30A, § 14(8) (e) (1966).
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each item of damages against the common law rules governing damages
in tort suits.
But the court's reasoning does not justify the conclusion that the
award is to be governed by common law principles from the observation
that the Commission may award damages other than those specifically
enumerated in the statute. The procedural statute governing the
MCAD does empower it to award damages in cases involving housing
discrimination, but such awards are part of a complex statutory scheme
of antidiscrimination law enforcement and do not derive-contrary to
the court's position-from a general power to award damages analogous
to common law tort actions.
There are two compelling reasons dictating a strict reading of the
Commission's statutory power to award damages. The first is based
on an analysis of the remedy clause itself. The enumerated remedies
are designed under the clear wording of the statute to operate primarily
prospectively through the use of conciliation and orders requiring
offenders to cease discrimination and take affirmative action such as
hiring the complainant with back pay, admitting him to a labor or-
ganization, or renting him previously denied housing. Although not
exclusive, the damages authorized in housing discrimination cases are
clearly of a common type-compensation for out-of-pocket expenses
uniquely connected with housing discrimination and analogous to the
allowance for back pay in employment discrimination cases. When
the legislature lists the specific damages the Commission may award,
and these damages have a common similarity, the ejusdem generis
principle of construction' 0 speaks strongly for restricting the "but
shall not be limited to" phrase to out-of-pocket expenses such as com-
muting or storage costs, especially when this construction produces a
harmonious statutory scheme.
Second, the different types of affirmative action and categories
of damages authorized by the Massachusetts legislature for each of
the three respective antidiscrimination statutes within the purview of
the MCAD 21 demonstrate that the legislature believed that enforce-
ment would be most effective if sanctions were specifically enumerated
for each of the different types of discrimination. An individual can
seek enforcement of any one of the three statutes through a private
action alleging a violation of one of the substantive statutes or through
an MCAD administrative proceeding.' In the latter case, the remedies
authorized by the legislature are specifically drawn to counter most
effectively the particular type of discrimination alleged. For example,
if the individual alleges discrimination in employment, the remedy
20 This principle ordinarily limits general terms given with a series of particular
terms to the common class described by the particular terms. Cf. Weyerhauser S.S.
Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 597, 600-01 (1963).
21 See note 11 =pra.
22 See MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 151B, § 9 (Supp. 1969).
1268 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.118:1263
clause provides that the Commission may order the employer to cease
unlawful discrimination, rehire the individual, and award damages
equal to his loss of pay. But general damages cannot be awarded in
employment cases.' If the individual alleges public accommodations
discrimination in violation of sections 92A and 98 of chapter 272,
the Commission can merely issue a cease and desist order under the
remedy clause: ' the legislature apparently believed that the remedies
already provided in such cases were adequate to assure compliance.
These remedies include (1) a fine of up to $300 in a criminal action
brought by the attorney general or (2) a private right of action based
upon the substantive violation but specifically limited by that statute
to a maximum recovery of $500.' So too, the remedies uniquely
applicable to housing discrimination cases were limited by the addi-
tional phrases added to the remedy clause. The specific enumeration
of the types of damages permitted such as moving and storage expenses
speak strongly for a limitation of the "but not limited to" phrase.
Here again, the MCAD was not authorized to award general damages
such as might be recovered if the individual sought to recover in a
private tort action. The pattern of specific remedies for specific types
of discrimination further supports this narrow construction.
The legislative history of the housing discrimination sections pro-
vides further support for a narrow reading of the remedy clause. The
statute did not provide a damages remedy until 1965.26 When the
damage remedy was added, however, it was directed only to housing
and real estate discrimination although the antidiscrimination laws
administered by the Commission were and remain much broader than
housing and real estate cases.17 Thus, absent specific language to this
effect, it is extremely difficult to argue that the legislature intended to
grant the Commission power to award damages for mental suffering
to victims of one class of unlawful discrimination while denying it the
power to award such damages to the victims of other types of dis-
crimination. The sounder conclusion from the terms, structure, and
history of the housing discrimination remedy clause is that the "but
shall not be limited to" phrase was intended to include only out-of-
pocket expenses uniquely related to housing discrimination and not
general tort damages or compensation for mental suffering.
III. REACHING FOR CONFORMITY: THE INFLUENCE OF THE
FEDERAL HOUSING ACT OF 1968
An explanation for the Franzaroli court's willingness to extend
the Commission's enforcement remedies may stem from a federal-state
2 See id. § 5.
24Id.
25 Id. ch. 272, §§ 92A, 98 (1968).
26 Ch. 569, [1965] Acts and Resolves of Mass. 339.
27 See note 11 supra.
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tension in the area of housing discrimination created by the growing
federal involvement in the area. Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1968 ' provides complementary federal and state enforcement of
fair housing laws. But if a state does not provide its citizens rights
and remedies substantially equivalent to those provided by federal fair
housing legislation, the state's antidiscrimination commission and courts
may find themselves preempted by federal enforcement.
Title VIII opened two avenues to victims of housing discrimina-
tion: I a noncoercive administrative remedy permitting suit in federal
court if conciliation efforts fail,"° and a direct civil suit in federal or
state court based on the federal substantive law." In the first, federal
efforts to secure compliance are to be withheld pending action by state
or local agencies when their rights and remedies for housing discrimi-
nation are "substantially equivalent" to those of title VIII. 2 If these
2s42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19 (Supp. IV, 1969). Title VIII became effective immedi-
ately upon passage on April 11, 1968, but only as applied to certain classes of housing
owned or financed in specific ways by the federal government. Id. §3603(a)(1).
Thereafter, coverage was automatically extended on January 1, 1969, and again on
January 1, 1970, so that it now covers all housing except (a) single family homes
sold by bona fide private individual owners without the aid of real estate facilities or
personnel and without advertising indicating the intent to discriminate, and (b) units
in owner-occupied dwellings to be occupied by no more than four families including
the owner (the "Mrs. M\furphy" provision). Id. § 3603(b) (1), (2). See also DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, EXPLANATION OF THE PROPOSED SUBSTITUTE BrLt (AMENDMENT No. 554),
H.R. No. 2156, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968). For a general discussion of the private
enforcement provisions of title VIII, see Note, Discrimination in Employment and
in Housing: Private Enforcement Provisions of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and
1968, 82 HAsv. L. REv. 834 (1969).
29A third avenue for a victim alleging housing discrimination on racial grounds
was opened in 1968 by the Supreme Court's holding that 42 U.S.C. §1982 (1964),
originally part of § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, was constitutional under the
thirteenth amendment when construed to forbid purely private discrimination in the
sale of real estate, and would support injunctive relief. Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co.,
392 U.S. 409 (1968) ; accord, Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229 (1969)
(Court held that § 1982 will also support an action for compensatory damages). While
the majority opinion held that § 1982 would not be nullified by title VIII, the minority
pointed out that title VIII will provide relief for most victims of housing discrimina-
tion. The Court spoke of purely private discrimination in both cases, but the factual
situations involved housing developments. This, plus the "vague and open-ended"
nature of § 1982 as interpreted by the Court, see 396 U.S. at 241 (Harlan, J., dis-
senting), makes it unlikely that any victim who could make a case cognizable under
title VIII would seek recourse to § 1982.
30 42 U.S.C. § 3610 (Supp. IV, 1969). The person aggrieved may file a complaint
with the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, who in turn may attempt to
resolve the complaint through conference, conciliation, and persuasion as governed by
certain procedural safeguards, id. §§ 3610(a), (b). If the Secretary, and any state or
local agency to which he must refer the complaint, cannot resolve it, the person
aggrieved may commence a civil action in an appropriate United States district court
without regard to any jurisdictional amount. Id. § 3610(d). On a finding that a
discriminatory housing practice has occurred or is about to occur, the court is em-
powered to enjoin the respondent or order such affirmative action as may be appropriate.
Such relief is made "subject to section 3612," id., which provides procedures and
remedies for a direct suit, but whether this is intended as a procedural limitation or
as an enumeration of remedies is unclear. See id. § 3612(c). It is possible that the
remedies under § 3610(d) might be construed to be narrower than those available
under § 3612.
31 Id. § 3612.
32 Id. § 3610(c). Questions regarding the efficacy of state and local remedies and
procedures are determined by the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development.
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agencies fail to effect conciliation, the aggrieved party may sue in
federal court unless he has available to him a state judicial remedy
"substantially equivalent" to the rights and remedies provided by title
VIII.3" In the second, the aggrieved party apparently faces no ex-
haustion requirements of any nature, and may simply bring an action
directly in the federal court3 4
A. The Administrative Remedy-Judicial Control of
Access to Federal Court
The federal standards of title VIII against which the state or
local antidiscrimination laws must be compared provide rights roughly
coextensive with those provided by the Massachusetts housing dis-
crimination law. 5 But in the area of judicial remedies, the two statutes
are different in several important respects. Although both federal and
Massachusetts law contemplate similar injunctive relief, the federal
remedies further include a potentially broader compensatory damage
clause, court costs, attorney's fees for those unable to pay them, and
up to $1000 punitive damages. 6
Because the coverage of title VIII is nearly congruent with the
Massachusetts prohibitions against housing discrimination, most Mas-
sachusetts complainants may seek relief either through the MCAD or
the federal conciliation procedure or district court. If a victim has
first chosen federal administrative conciliation and later attempts to
carry his complaint into federal court, the court will entertain the
action only if the state's judicial remedies are not "substantially
equivalent" to those provided by title VIII."
To determine whether Massachusetts' judicial remedies are "sub-
stantially equivalent" to the federal remedies, it is necessary to con-
sider the apparently dual purpose of the federal statute-vindication of
the victim's interest in open housing and abolition of housing dis-
33 Id.§ 3610(d).
34 Id. § 3612(a). Under § 3610(c), if the Secretary determines that in his judg-
ment, under the circumstances of the case, the protection of the rights of the parties
or the interests of justice require, he may reenter a case previously referred to a
state or local agency. Thus under § 3612 if, following a direct suit, conciliation is
sought through the Secretary and referred to the state or local agency, that agency
may be preempted by either the Secretary or the court if it fails to resolve the com-
plaint promptly and adequately.
35 Compare note 11 supra, with note 28 supra.
3642 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (Supp. IV, 1969).
371d. §3610(d). In Colon v. Tompkins Square Neighbors, Inc., 289 F. Supp.
104 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), the court, applying § 3610 in a suit alleging unlawful discrimina-
tion on the basis of race and status as welfare recipients, first dismissed the suit on
the grounds that an adequate state remedy was available. On reargument the court
dismissed the racial discrimination claim, but reinstated the welfare recipient discrimi-
nation claim pending outcome of an appeal to the Second Circuit in a similar but
unrelated case. Id. at 108. There was no report that a complaint had ever been
filed with the Secretary; therefore, the case may have been properly cognizable under
§ 3612.
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crimination in general.3 Because Massachusetts empowers its com-
mission both to enjoin unlawful discrimination and take affirmative
action to place the victim in previously denied housing and to compen-
sate for out-of-pocket expenses, the first federal objective will in most
instances be served by the state scheme. An award of damages in
addition to out-of-pocket costs may in one sense assuage the sting of
discrimination, but in a larger sense it relates more closely to the elimi-
nation of discrimination because it penalizes the discriminator. Thus,
in the absence of authority to award damages for mental suffering,
the MCAD and other agencies operating under similarly limited en-
abling statutes may be unable to accomplish the second federal purpose
of eliminating housing discrimination generally.
Franzaroli is unusual because the Commission found a factual
basis for the substantial award of $594.50 for lost time and out-of-
pocket expenses in addition to the award for mental suffering.3 9 Hous-
ing discrimination cases in New York4 and New Jersey 4' indicate
that most victims are unable to prove such damages. When a dis-
criminator realizes that under the statute he stands to lose little or no
money and can only be ordered to cease discrimination and rent to
the individual he had previously refused, the statute is unlikely to
have any significant deterrent effect. Punitive damages are a wind-
fall rather than a right ' and a federal court should not be concerned
with the omission of a punitive damages provision in a state statute
for purposes of vindicating a victim. But a determination of "sub-
stantial equivalence" might turn upon the state's inclusion of a damages
provision which would achieve a deterrent effect comparable to that
of title VIII.
B. Direct Civil Suit-Unrestricted Access to Federal Court
In addition, the state must overcome an even more difficult prob-
lem if its antidiscrimination agency is to retain a role in fair housing
enforcement. In the first alternative available under title VIII, the
federal district court may look to the broad purposes of the federal
statute to determine whether a "substantially equivalent" state judicial
remedy exists. But under the second alternative available under title
VIII, the victim may file suit directly in federal or state court under the
federal statute without prior recourse to either federal or state admin-
3842 U.S.C. § 3601 (Supp. IV, 1969) declares the policy of the United States to
provide, within constitutional limitations, fair housing throughout the United States.
In deciding to act under § 3610(c) if the state or local agency has proven ineffectual,
the Secretary must consider "the protection of the rights of the parties" and
"the interests of justice"; and the judicial remedies of § 3 6 12 (c) operate both to
compensate the victim and to deter housing discrimination generally.
3 9 See note 14 supra.
40 See note 45 infra.
41 See note 46 infra.
42W. PRossER, THE LAw OF ToRTs 13 (3d ed. 1964).
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istrative conciliation.4 3 Thus, unless the state provides both a remedy
substantially equivalent in the judgment of the victim to those available
under title VIII, and a procedural framework at least as efficient and
effective as the federal framework, a victim is unlikely to look to the
state's antidiscrimination agency and courts for relief.
In this context, a peculiar feature of Massachusetts law takes on
added significance. The common law of Massachusetts permits puni-
tive damages only when specifically authorized by statute.4 Thus,
the supreme judicial court found itself confronted by a three-pronged
dilemma. The MCAD enabling legislation permits no more than out-
of-pocket expenses. The common law prohibits punitive damages
unless specifically authorized. But title VIII requires by its purposes
and alternative provisions for federal relief both an effective deterrent
to housing discriminators and potential remedies at least as promising
as the federal legislation if a state's agency and lower courts are to
remain in the business of protecting Massachusetts' citizens from Mas-
sachusetts' discriminators. Faced with this dilemma, the MCAD and
the supreme judicial court in Franzaroli, by luck or design, hit upon
a dubious solution. Regardless of the basis for the award of damages
for mental suffering, there can be little doubt that such an award will
both deter potential discriminators and provide substantially similar
remedies for a victim who might otherwise be tempted to go directly
into federal court.45 Thus, by giving an unsupportably broad inter-
43 See Brown v. LoDuca, 307 F. Supp. 102 (E.D. Wis. 1969) (order granting
preliminary injunction). Section 3612(a) authorizes a court to continue a civil case
if the victim has filed a complaint under § 3610(a) and "the court believes that the
conciliation efforts of the Secretary or a State or local agency are likely to result in
satisfactory settlement of the discriminatory housing practice complained of," but does
not empower the court to require resort to such measures in lieu of or as a condition
to judicial relief.
44 City of Lowell v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 313 Mass. 257, 47 N.E.2d
265 (1943) ; Genga v. Director General of R.Rs., 243 Mass. 101, 137 N.E. 637 (1922) ;
Boott Mills v. Boston & M. R.R., 218 Mass. 582, 106 N.E. 680 (1914); Ellis v.
Brockton Publishing Co., 198 Mass. 538, 84 N.E. 1018 (1908). See also Comment,
Punitive Tort Damages It New England, 41 B.U.L. REv. 389, 390 (1961).
45 The New York State Division for Human Rights and the New York City
Commission on Human Rights have recently attempted to enforce damages for mental
suffering, but with considerably less success than the MCAD. In language much
broader than the Massachusetts statute, these two agencies are identically empowered
to award "compensatory damages to the person aggrieved by such practice, as, in the
judgment of the division, will effectuate the purposes of this article." N.Y. Exrc.
LAw § 297(4) (c) (iii) (McKinney Supp. 1969); N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § B1-8.0 (2) (c)
(Supp. 1969-70). While this language standing alone might support an award of
compensatory damages for mental suffering, it places the New York agencies on the
same footing as the MCAD with respect to penal damages.
The first attempts to obtain enforcement of mental suffering damages were made
by the City Division in three successive reported awards of $100. The first failed on
the grounds, inter alia, that while discrimination had been shown, "[t]here is not the
slightest degree of proof in this regard that [the complainant] was in anywise humili-
ated, outraged and anguished by the result of the landlady's action." Weynberg v.
Commission on Human Rights, 56 Misc. 2d 1, 3, 287 N.Y.S.2d 1002, 1005 (Kings
County 1968). The second was enforced with no recitation of the facts, Commission
on Human Rights v. Knox Realty Corp., 56 Misc. 2d 806, 290 N.Y.S2d 633 (Queens
County 1968), and the third failed on the grounds that the complainant was making
a practice of seeking out discrimination and collecting damages, Commission on Human
Rights v. Hardenbrook Realty Corp., 57 Misc. 2d 430, 292 N.Y.S2d 775 (Queens
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pretation to the phrase "but shall not be limited to" in the MCAD
enabling statute, the supreme judicial court has produced a result
which brings Massachusetts enforcement remedies in line with federal
law, thereby keeping its state antidiscrimination agency in the fore-
front of local discrimination problems and limiting federal enforcement
to an auxiliary role.'
It is clear from the construction of title VIII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1968 that state and local fair housing commissions were intended
to play a broad and basic role in the enforcement of antidiscrimination
County 1968). These three cases indicate that the City Commission is not only
awarding damages on dubious statutory grounds, but further, that it is awarding at
least a flat $100 without any proof of damages at all. Such awards are penal in
nature and not payable under the New York City statute.
The only report of an order which would tend to negate this pattern of flat
awards with no proof of damages actually makes the situation appear more flagrant.
The New York Times reported that, on a finding of housing discrimination against a
member of the Jewish faith by a Manhattan cooperative apartment group and the
cooperative's managing firm (stated to be one of the largest in the city), the City
Commission awarded the complainant $1000 for humiliation, outrage, and mental
anguish. N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 1969, at 1, col. 5. It appears that the Commission
looked to the financial status of the respondents-a traditional element of punitive
damages-rather than the suffering of the complainant. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS
§908 (1939).
When the State Division followed suit, however, it met with a firmer reply in
the appellate division. A divided court denied enforcement of two awards, one for
compensatory damages and attorneys fees, and another for mental suffering, State
Division of Human Rights v. Luppino, - App. Div. 2d -, 313 N.Y.S.2d 28 (2d Dep't
1970), holding first that the division had no power to award compensatory damages
other than out-of-pocket expenses, and second that, contrary to law, there was no
evidence supporting either award. Id. at -, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 32, 33. The dissenter,
Acting Presiding Justice Hopkins, while asserting that the statute would support
compensatory damages for mental suffering, agreed that "[t]he proof of discrimination
alone is not enough to found a claim for damages for mental anguish. There should
be such evidence of the claim as would be sufficient in a common law action . ...
Failing that evidence, the award cannot be sustained." Id. at -, 313 N.Y.S2d at 35.
justice Hopkins sensed the issue discussed in this Comment when he said:
The violation of a civil right under the Executive Law may be categorized
as a wrong-whether as a new form of a tort created by statute, or as simply
the means whereby socially inimical behavior is penalized, is not necessary
now to be decided.
Id. at -, 313 N.Y.S2d at 34.
46 New Jersey is about to join Massachusetts and Newv York in facing the choice
between enlarging the antidiscrimination agency's powers or forgoing effective agency
deterence to discrimination. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18:25-1 to 18:25-28 (Supp. 1967)
("Law Against Discrimination'). Originally, the director of the New Jersey Division
on Civil Rights took the position that his Division had power to award damages for
"out of pocket" expenses only. N.Y. Times, May 6, 1970, at 1, cols. 6-7. But shortly
thereafter, the Division, contrary to its director's earlier statement, awarded $2000 to
a Malayasian official for humiliation, mental pain, and suffering resulting from unlawful
housing discrimination. Id., May 17, 1970, at 50, col. 1. The probable reason for this
switch in the Division's policy was the award by the Superior Court of Essex County,
New Jersey of $500 for "psychological trauma"-on a showing of nothing more than
the momentary shock of being racially insulted-to a plaintiff who had chosen to
bypass the Division and go directly to court. Id., May 6, 1970, at 1, cols. 6-7.
Also, according to Richard Bellmon, the staff attorney of the National Com-
mittee against Discrimination in Housing, the only previous awards for
mental anguish in housing discrimination cases were made by state agencies
in cases where prolonged mental anguish had been suffered by the victim.
In this case, the only mental anguish shown by Mr. Gray was the momentary
traumatic shock of being racially insulted when he sought to rent the apart-
ment.
Id., May 10, 1970, § IV, at 5, col. 1.
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laws, and federal machinery only to supercede local administration
when it would not or could not achieve the purposes of title VIII.47
It is also apparent that both Congress and state and local agencies
believe that a punitive sanction is essential if the antidiscrimination
laws are to be effective." If state and local antidiscrimination com-
missions are to play an active and coordinated role in the congressional
scheme, part of which is deterrent law enforcement, state legislatures
should empower their antidiscrimination agencies to award punitive
damages comparable to title VIII.
CONCLUSION
The day of enforcing fair housing laws through persuasion backed
only with the threat of the state's command to cease and desist has
passed. Congress has now provided a punitive remedy available to
every victim of housing discrimination whether or not the state legis-
lature agrees with that policy. The only option to the state legislature
is to either bring its agency into the fray with punitive damage legis-
lation or abandon the field to federal enforcement entirely. If the
task of bringing the state agencies into the federal scheme continues
to be ignored by these legislatures, judicial attempts at legislating
within the confining language of statutes written in that earlier day
can only produce questionable law.
47 See, e.g., Colon v. Tompkins Square Neighbors, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 104 (S.D.N.Y.
1968). While federal administrative proceedings cannot be compelled because of
§ 3612's optional remedy of a private suit, the existence of that option is, in effect,
impetus for the state to provide remedies at least as promising as federal remedies.
4 8See notes 45, 46 supra.
